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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LLOYD C. ANDERSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BINGHAM AND GARFIELD RAIL-
WAY COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
7356 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below. 
All italics are ours. 
The event, out of which this action arose, took place 
and occurred at approximately 9 :00 o'clock p.m., on the 
23rd day of May, 1947, at the point where defendant's 
railroad track crosses U. S. Highway No. 50. The high-
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way extends in a general easterly-westerly direction and 
the railroad tracks run parallel with the highway and to 
the south thereof for approximately one-fourth of a mile. 
The track circles to the northwest and crosses U. f:::l. 
Highway No. 50 a short distanee north of Garfield, Utah 
(R. 116, 117). 
The ridge of mountains to the south of the tracks has 
the effect of casting a dark shadow over equipment mov-
ing along the tracks at night and removing any silhou-
etting against the sky which mi~ht reveal the presence of 
a train or other equipment on the tracks (R. 136). 
Lloyd C. Andersen, a young man 23 years of age, was 
driving his 1935 Plymouth Sedan in an easterly direc-
tion on U. S. Highway No. 50 from Tooele, Utah, where 
he was employed as a Supply Clerk at the Deseret Chem-
ical Warfare Depot toward Salt Lake City (R. 140, 141). 
At the time he left Tooele it was dark and he was 
required to use the headlights on his automobile. His last 
memory of the trip toward Salt Lake City was that he 
stopped at the junction of Tooele Highway and U. S. 
Highway No. 50 and then proceeded in an easterly direc-
tion along U. S. Highway No. 50. (R. 144, 145 ). His 
1935 automobile was in good condition prior to the 
accident (R. 169). 
Defendant's train, consisting of fifteen gondola type 
cars, being shoved in front of a Diesel engine, was ap-
proaching the crossing traveling in a westerly and 
northwesterly direction. 'rhere were no lights on the 
leading car except lanterns carried by three members 
of the train crew. The engineer was on the right-hand 
side of the engine as it approached the crossing. As 
defendant's train approached the crossing it vvas travel-
ing at a speed of between seven and ten miles per hour 
(Exhibit 11 - R. 223, 250). 
It vv3:s a dark night and the engine's headlight cast 
a strong beam of light over the top~ of the low gondola 
cars toward the west along the foot of the mountains, 
as the train proceeded toward the crossing. The illusion ) 
thus created wa~ that the headlight was at the front of the 
train and probably accounts for plaintiff's failure to 
observe the cars as he approached the cro~sing (R. 129, 
175). 
At the time of the accident there were no lights or / 
automatic safety devices at the crossing; no flagman 
was ~tationed there. The only warning to eastbound 
traffic was a standard reflectorized cross-buck warning . 
sign and a standard warning sign located approximately It € · : 
· 1 i\t 
417 feet to the west of the crossing. st? 
As the train neared the crossing three members of 
the crew, riding on the leading car, observed the approach 
of plaintiff's automobile. The position of the men on the 
car is shown on Exhibit 7. After the men saw plaintiff's 
automobile approaching, Paddock, the engine foreman, 
in charge of the crew at the time, climbed to the top of 
the leading car. (R. 225). 
As plaintiff's automobile approached the crossmg 
it was traveling at a speed of between thirty-one and 
forty miles per hour (R. 172, 173, 184). 
7 
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Two of the trainmen waived their lanterns back and 
forth endeavoring to attract plaintiff's attention. 'l'here-
after, Paddock gave the engineer a "washout" signal 
(R. 225, 226). At the time Paddock gave the washout 
signal the leading end of the leadin,q car w:as about three 
car lengths from the railroad crossing (R. 226). A car 
length is approxh1mtely thirty-five feet (R. 256). 
As plaintiff's automobile approached the crossing 
it appeared to the men on the leading car as though he 
hesitated and then tried to go around the car (R. 230). 
Neither witness Doty nor his wife, who were follow-
ing plaintiff in their automobile, saw switchmen's lan-
terns on the front end of the train or were aware of the 
) presence of the train at the crossing until they saw the 
lights on plaintiff's automobile go up in the air and then 
saw the railroad cars proceeding across the crossing 
(R. 174, 179, 187). 
Paddock apparently was concerned over whether 
rplaintiff would observe the train sometime before the 
accident occurred because when the leading car was 
still a considerable distance from the crossing he went 
high on the leading car in order to be in a position to 
give a washout signal if necessary (R. 325, 326). 
Engineer Colby testified that as he approached the 
crossing and the leading car started around the curve 
he saw an automobile's headlights approaching from 
the west, traveling east, and that as he came closer to 
the crossing he observed the men on the leading car 
trying to attract the driver's attention. He slotced the 
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train down somewhat and tl1en attempted to bighole tlie 
tra-in. Shor·tly after he bigholed t.he train he received a 
washout signal from the leading end (R. 251, 252). It 
was engineer Colby's opinion that the train as made up 
on that evening and on that track and under the identical 
circumstances at the time could have been stopped with-
in about four car lengths had it gone into an emergency 
application of the automatic air brake system at the 
tirnc he attempted to bighole the train (R. 255). It will 
be recalled that at the time Paddock gave the washout 
signal the leading end of the leading ear was three car 
lengths from the crossing and that engineer Colby had 
bigholeu the train befor·e he saw the washout signal given. 
It would have taken less than one second for every brake 
on the train to have been placed in emergency application 
had the brakes been operating properly (R. 245). The 
train, however, traveled three car lengths before reach-
ing the intersection, thirty feet across the intersection 
and two hundred ten feet beyond before coming to a stop. 
The train traveled approximately nine and one-half 
car lengths after the brakes were applied and for two 
hundred seventeen feet of that distance was shoving the 
automobile sideways along the tracks and the leading 
trucks of the leading car were derailed and bumping 
along the ties (R. 327). If the brakes had responded ) 
properly the train would have been completely stopped 
in four to six car lengths (R. 255, 327). 
~.,' ,~., ·.~~ ;~· .><: d'( 
The automobile was demolished by the impact (R. 
120- Exhibit 7). The front trucks derailed at the point of 
collision (R. 229). When plaintiff's automobile came 
to rest after the accident it was 217 feet from a point 
midway in the westbound lane of traffic on U. S. High-
way No. 50 which appeared to be the point of collision 
(R. 119, 128- Exhibit 53). 
When Doty approached the automobile and the train 
after they had come to rest, the frame of the automobile 
was up against the leading car (R. 176). The automobile 
had been struck on the right front side approximately in 
the vicinity of the front door (Exhibit 8). 
The train had two braking systems, the independent 
air brake system which controlled the braking mechan-
".r.. isms of the locomotive itself and the automatic brake 
system which operated the brakes on the entire train. 
Both brakes were operated by air (R. 238). The auto-
matic air brakes were set by releasing air pressure in 
the brake line (R. 242). An emergency application of 
air in the automatic brake line permits all of the air to 
escape immediately from the train into the atmosphere 
which would cause the brakes to set on every car (R. 244). 
Throughout a long train it would not take over a second 
to apply every brake in the train by an emergency appli-
cation. On a train consisting of 10 cars and an engine it 
would take considerably less than one second to actuate 
the entire braking system on the train (R. 245). If the 
pressure in the automatic air brake syst(~m were too 
low, it would be impossible for the engineer to throw 
the brakes of the train into emergency application even 
though he released all of the air (R. 245). 
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Before the accident occurred, as Engineer Colby pro-
ceeded along the foot of the mountain on a descending 
grade toward the crossing, he was required to use some 
braking power to keep from going too fast (R. 249). As 
he proceeded along he observed the guage in the engiw~ 
and noted that the air pressure in the automatic brah 
system continued to lower indicating leakage in the 
system (R. 249). He also observed that he could not 
leave the automatic air brake in lap or neutral posi-
tion very long or it would reduce the train line pressure 
too much and that the leakage on this train was un-
usual. He kept fighting the loss of air and leakage 
all the way down the hill by putting the locomotive iu 
neutral and opening the throttle to speed up the corn-
pressors and make pressure faster (R. 281, 282). This 
procedure would not have been necessary if the usual and 
normal amount of leakage had been present (R. 282). 
As a matter of fact, the independent air brake system 
actuating the engine brakes played a large part in the 
operation of the train on the evening of the accident 
(R. 281). According to the Air Brake Pocket Handbook 
the brake pipe leakage should not have exceeded five 
pounds per minute (R. 287). On this particular train 
the leakage was much greater than the five pounds per 
minute authorized by the pocket handbook (R. 295 ). 
When Engineer Colby attempted to bighole the 
train he did not get an emergency application through-
out the train (R. 252). He never did get an emergency 
application (R. 254). He was certain that the train did 
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not go into emergency because the train line gauge did 
not immediately go to zero but dropped down gradu-
ally ( R. 283). The reason he didn't get an emergency 
application throughout the train was that the pressure 
in the system was too low (R. 245). 
When we consider that a fraction of a second 
-·~·-- ... _.._. ... ~.-. 
would have given plaintiff sufficient time to have passed 
across the intersection to safety and that the defective 
brakes caused the train to be moved 91h car lengths, 
217 feet of that distance shoving an automobile side-
ways before it, and with the front trucks of the leading 
car derailed, and that the train in engineer Colby's 
opinion could have been stopped within four car lengths 
had an emergency application been obtained, it is clear 
\;,. ··- , .... " 
that the cause of this accident was the defective brakes 
of the train. 
Plaintiff was very seriously injured. He was un-
conscious in the hospital for seven days following the 
accident (R. 146). He suffered a severe concussion of 
the brain and a double compound fracture of his left 
leg (R. 147). He had a Zimmer splint, consisting of 
four quarter inch pins and a device holding the pins in 
fixed position on his leg for approximately five days 
after which the bone slipped necessitating replacement 
of the splint with a spica cast covering his body from 
the breast down over the right leg and half way down 
on the left leg (R. 148). This cast remained in place 
for approximately one month and three weeks and 
thereafter another cast was placed on his body and 
leg~. The total time that hi~ body and legs were in 
casts was three and a half months (R. 150). He was 
hospitalized for five months and three weeks and after 
leaving the hospital was on crutche~ for two month8 
and on a cane for an additional three months (R. 152). 
At the time of the trial, more than one and one half year8 
after the accident, the cords and muscles in his right leg 
were tied up and grown to the flesh so that he could not 
flex his leg in a normal manner (R. 153). He suffered 
permanent injury to his right leg and permanent injury 
to the brain substance resulting from the serious con-
cussion which he had received (R. 203, 212). 
We submit that a grave miscarriage of justice was 
perpetrated when the jury returned a no cause of action 
verdict and that the jury's verdict ean only have re-
sulted from confusing, misleading and erroneous in-
structions by the trial court as will be hereinafter dis-
cussed. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The Court erred m giving Instruction No. 11. 
2. The Court erred m giving Instruction No. 15. 
3. The Court erred in refusing to give plaintiff's 
requested Instruction No. 3. 
4. The Court erred m overruling plaintiff's mo-




SUMMARY O:F' ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
WHERE THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR 
CHANCE IS PRESENTED AS AN ISSUE FOR 
THE .JURY IT IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS FOR 
THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THAT I:F' THE NEG-
LIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF CONTRIBUTED TO 
CAUSE HIS OWN INJURY HE CANNOT RECOV-
ER. (Assignment of Errors 1, 2, 3 and 4). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
WHERE THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR 
CHANCE IS PRESENTED AS AN ISSUE FOR 
THE JURY IT IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS FOR 
THE COURT TO INSTRUCT THAT IF THE NEG-
LIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF CONTRIBUTED TO 
CAUSE HIS OWN INJURY HE CANNOT RECOV-
ER. (Assignment of Errors 1, 2, 3 and 4). 
J
ll (a) Defendant was clearly negligent in its violation 
V of the Federal Safety Appliance Act. 
The ground of negligence relied upon by the plain-
tiff in submission of this case to the jury is set forth 
m plaintiff's complaint as follows (R. 5) : 
" (e) That prior to the time of the occur-
rence of the grievance, as herein set forth, the 
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Congress of the United States of America passed 
a law which was in full force and effect at said 
time, to wit: 45 U.S.C.A. 1, which provides as 
follows: 
'It shall be unlawful for any common car-
rier engaged in interstate commerce by 
railroad to use on its line any locomotive 
engine in moving interstate traffic not 
equipped with a power driving-wheel 
brake and appliances for operating the 
train-brake system, or to run any train in 
such traffie that has not a sufficient num-
ber of cars in it so equipped with power or 
train brakes that the engineer on the loco-
motive drawing such train can control its / 
spee~L_:r.:.~g_~i.rjn_gJn-~k~~~.I?:. ~() ... 11se 
.. the commo_n lumd l;lrtJJ\:e fo~ "th!l.~. :purpose.' 
That in violation of said law, defendant, at the 
time and place aforesaid, negligently, recklessly 
and carelessly operated in interstate commerce the 
said engine and string of fifteen gondola cars 
equipped with brakes that would not, and could 
not, retard or control the speed of said train when 
operated by the engineer in the usual and ordi-
nary manner, and that because of the inefficiency 
and inadequacy of said brakes the engineer was 
unable to retard or decrease the speed of the train 
or bring it to a stop when to do so would have 
averted the accident with resultant injuries to 
plaintiff as herein alleged." 
This case was originally removed to the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah, Central 
Division, because of the allegation heretofore set forth 
(R. 16, 17, 18, 24). Thereafter, the case was tried m 
the United States District Court for the District of 
12 
Utah, Central Division, and a verdict returned in plain-
tiff's favor. Plaintiff, however, being dissatisfied with 
the verdict, appealed to the United States Court ol' 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on the ground and for 
the reason that the case was wrongfully removed to 
the Federal Court. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit at 109 Fed. ( 2d) 328 reversed the 
judgment with directions to remand the case to the 
state court, and stated as follows: 
"The allegations in the complaint charging 
as an element of negligence failure on the part 
of the defendant to comply with the exactions of 
the Safety Appliance Act merely tendered the is-
sue of fact whether the train was operated with-
out brakes being in operative condition as required 
by the Act. The complaint did not present any 
issue or controversy in respect to the validity, 
construction, or effect of the Act. It did not set 
forth any right or immunity which would be sup-
ported if the Act be given one construction or 
effect and defeated if given another. While the 
pertinent provisions of the Act lurked in the 
background as creating a duty the breach of which 
constituted negligence, the right of action avail-
able and the incidents of such right of action 
sprang from the law of Utah. It did not arise 
under the laws of the United States. Minneapolis, 
St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co. v. Pop-
plar, supra; Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway 
Co., supra; Gilvray v. Cuyahoya Valley Railway 
Co., supra; Fairport, Painesville & Eastern Rail-
road Co. v. Meredith, supra; Tipton v. Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., supra. There-
fore, the cause was not removable.'' 
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The Safety Appliance Act clearly imposes a duty 
on carriers by railroad in interstate commerce for the 
protection of travelers on the public highways. 
In the case of FairpoTt, P. Jl; E. R. Co. v. Meredith, 
292 U. S. 589, 54 S. Ct. 826, 828, (decided ,J nne 4, 1934), 
it was contended that the Federal Safety Appliance Aet 
was intended only for the proteetion of railroad em-
ployees and passengers and that its protection did not 
extend to travelers upon public highways. The Supreme 
Court of the United States held that Congress, by the 
enactment of the F'ederal Safety Appliance Act, pro-
vided protection to travelers upon public highways as 
well as to railroad employees and passengers. The Court 
stated: 
'' * * • To confine the beneficial effect of 
these provisions to employees and passengers 
would be to impute to Congress an intention to 
ignore the equally important element which their 
enactment actually contributes to the safety of 
travelers at highway crossings. Since all of these 
three classes of persons are within the mischief 
at which the provisions are aimed, it is quite rea-
sonable to interpret the statute imposing the duty 
as including all of them.'' 
See also Brady v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 303 
U. S. 10, 58 S. Ct. 426. 
The Safety Appliance Act imposes an absolute and 
continuing duty on interstate carriers by. railroad -to. 
·~aE;-tain the automatic air brake systems on trains in 
proper and efficient condition. 
14 
Roberts' Federal Liabilities of Carriers, Vol. 2 (2d 
Ed.) discusses the absolute character of the carriers duty 
in maintaining safe and efficient brake systems on their 
trains and locomotives : 
"Sec. 597. Tests of compliance with Act. The 
statute requires, not only that a train be equipped 
with the prescribed minimum percentage of pow-
er-braked cars, but also that all power-braked 
cars in the train which are associated together 
with such minimum 'shall have their brakes so 
used and operated.' * * * The test of compliance 
with the requirement that the power-braked cars 
of the train 'shall have their brakes so used and 
operated' seems, under the authorities, to be 
whether the train-brake system as a whole was 
capable of efficient use and operation at the time 
in question. Equipment of the train with a pow-
er-brake system conforming to the standard set 
by the Act is not enough. It must also meet 
and respond to the test of actual u.se. It must 
give the engineer efficient control of the train." 
(Italics ours.) 
"Sec. 656. Duty under Safety Ap!pliance Act. 
Whatever grounds there may have been for enter-
taining a contrary view, it is now settled that the 
Federal Safety Appliance Act imposes an absolute 
and unqualified duty, upon the carriers subject to 
its terms, to provide and maintain the equipment 
specified by its provisions and by the orders of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission promul-
gated by its authority. As to the installation and 
maintenance of the equipment required by the act 
and these orders, an absolute duty rests upon the 
carrier, and neither ignorance of the fact of non-
compliance, nor bona fide and diligent efforts to 
15 
prevent it, will exonerate the carrier from res-
ponsibility for the consequences of the default. 
'' 'The Congress,' said the national Supreme 
Court in a pioneer case construing this statue, 'not 
satisfied with the common-law duty and its result-
ing liability, has prescribed and defined the duty 
by statute. We have nothing to do but to ascertain 
and declare the meaning of a few simple words in 
which the duty is described. It is enacted that 
'no cars, either loaded or unloaded, shall be used 
in interstate traffic which do not comply with 
the standard.' There is no escape from the mean-
ing of these words. Explanation cannot clarify 
them and ought not to be employed to confuse 
them or lessen their significance. The obvious pur- \ 
pose of the legislature was to supplant the quali- J\ 
fied duty of the common law with an absolute 
duty deemed by it more just." / ___ _, 
The absolute liability created by the Safety Appli-
ance Act is sufficiently established by evidence which 
proves that the equipment challenged has performed in 
an inefficient manner. See Didinger v .. Pennsylvania 
R. Co., 39 F. (2d) 798, (6 C.C.A., Apr. 7, 1930); Lehigh 
Valley R. Co. v. Howell, 6 F. (2d) 784; Anderson v. 
Chesa1peake &: 0. R. Co., 186 N. E. 185, certiorari denied, 
54 S. Ct. 93, 78 L. Ed. 583. 
In the case of Spokane &: I.E.R. Co .. v. Campbell, 
241 U. S. 497, 60 L. Ed. 1125, 36 S. Ct. 683, the United 
States Supreme Court interpreted Sections 1 and 9 of 
the Federal Safety Appliance Act as imposing upon a, 
railroad a mandatory and absolute duty of maintaining 
the air brakes on interstate trains in a state of proper 
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repair so that they can be efficiently operated. In that 
case the plaintiff, an engineer, was injured when the 
air brakes on the train he was operating did not holcl 
and a head-on collision with another train resulted. 'l'he 
pertinent portions of the Court's opinion are as follows: 
"It is insisted that there \Vas no evidence 
that the provision of the Safety Appliance Act 
respecting train brakes was violated. It is of 
course settled that if the equipment was in fact 
defective or out of repair, the question whether 
this was attributable to the company's negli-
gence is immaterial. St. Louis & C. Ry. v. Taylor, 
210 U. S. 281, 294 (21 Am. Neg. Rep. 464); Chi-
cago & C. Ry. v. United States, 220 U. S. 559, 
575; Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, ante, pp. 33, 43. 
Hence the argument is that, according to all of 
the evidence, the equipment was not defective 
or out or repair. It appeared without dispute 
that it consisted of the Westinghouse standard 
automatic air brake, such as is in general use 
throughout the country upon passenger trains. 
A witness in defendant's employ testified that 
shortly before Campbell took the train out from 
Coeur d'Alene on the trip in question he in-
spected the air brakes and found them in perfect 
order. But there was much evidence besides that 
of Campbell himself to the effect that when he 
applied the emergency the brakes took hold and 
then leaked off so as to release the brakes. The 
jury was warranted in finding from the testi-
mony &S a whole that Campbell properly applied 
the air when 600 feet or more from the place 
where the collision occurred, and that the brakes 
refused to work. Expert witnesses called by de-
fendant testified in effect that the train could 
have been stopped inside of 300 feet if the 
17 
brakes had been in proper order. The air brake 
equipment was wrecked in the collision, so that 
there was no explanation of the cause of its 
failure to operate properly; but it was a reason-
able inference that there was some defect or want 
of repair in the valves or packing." 
As has been clearly demonstrated by the authori-
ties cited, the test of compliance lies in the perform-
ance' of the applian0e. The existence of negligence in 
the sense of failure to use care is immaterial and the 
principle of res ipsa loquitur applies. There can be no 
doubt of the failure of the brakes in defendant's train 
to function in a normal, proper and efficient manner. 
Had the brakes gone into emergency when the engineer 
made th·e "bighole" application, the train would have 
stopped within four car lengths (R. 255). However, the 
brakes, due to. their inefficiency, did not go into emer-
gency ~a;d--~~~·~~quentiy·-·the. ~~girceer was unable to 
stop the train in less tha11_ nine and a hal(_c;ar le11gth.s. 
It was the engineer's opinion that the reason the train 
brakes failed and did not go into emergency was that 
the air had leaked out of the brake line due to an ex-
cessive number of leaks in the train system. 
The evidence is clear and undisputed that the Fed- \ ·., 
eral Safety Appliance Act was violated; that this vio- \ 
lation rendered an emergency application of brakes in \ 
the train impossible and that this negligent act was the ' 
direct cause of plaintiff's injuries, damage and loss. 
\ (b) The doctrine of last cleaT chance u•as clearly )!I 
applicable in this case. f I 
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Plaintiff was traveling along an unlighted highway 
on a dark night. Defendant was shoving fifteen cars 
along the base of an abrupt range of mountains. The 
dark silhouette of the mountains enshrouded the track 
and tended to conceal the train as it approached the 
crossing. The unlighted gondola ears on the front end 
of the train circled a~way from the mountain toward the 
crossing; the light beams from the headlight of the 
locomotive were thrown westerly along the base of the 
mountains. There were no flashing lights or other warn-
ing devices, no flagman at the crossing., Unql_les~ionabl¥, 
the illusion existed that the engine was at the head of 
t~train. 
Defendant's negligence in moving upon and over 
its tracks a train equipped with inefficient and inade-
quate air brakes continued up to and including the very 
moment of the occurrence. The engineer had adequate 
and sufficient time within which to have avoided the 
accident had the brakes performed properly and effi-
ciently. 
It will be recalled that the train could have been 
stopped within four car lengths had it gone into an 
emergency application of the air brake system at the 
time Colby attempted to "bighole" the train (R. 255). 
Paddock gave the "washout" signal at a time when the 
leading car was three car lengths from the crossing and 
-the engineer had "bigholed" the train before the wash-
out signal was given. It would have taken less than 
one second for every brake in the train to have been 
placed in emergency application had the air brakes oper-
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ated properly. The train, however, traveled nine and 
a half instead of four car lengths and carried an auto-
mobile sideways down the tracks a distance of 217 feet 
at a time when the leading trucks of the leading gondola 
car were derailed. When it is recalled that the automo-
bile was struck on its side by the front end of the lead-
ing gondola ear and that. a _split second would have saved 
~~:-.)zlain~iH harmles~, there--;-:;;;I;;-ITttle question but 1( 
that defendant's continuing neglect in moving a train 
equipped with inefficient and inadequate air brakes 
along its track was superimposed upon the condition 
into which plaintiff had placed himself and became the 
primary efficient cause of his injuries. 
In the case of Thompson v. Salt Lake Rapid Tran-
sit Co., 16 Utah 281, 52 P. 92, 93 (decided Feb. 19, 1898), 
it appeared that decedent, a deaf and dumb mute minor 
child, 15 years of age, was crossing the tracks of the 
defendant on an angle with his back toward defendant's 
approaching car; that the operator observed the boy, 
rang the bell and then, observing that the bell did not 
attract his attention, attempted to stop the car, but 
failed and the car struck the boy, carrying him a distance 
of about 58 feet before stopping. The evidence was that 
the rear brake of the car was loose, and kicked off; that 
the brakes on the car were not in good condition and 
had not been in good condition for some time; that 
electric shocks from the brakes were frequent, and that 
when the operator of the car turned off the power, in-
tending to reverse the car, an electric shock from the 
brakes prevented his doing so until after the accident 
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had occurred. The operator of the car testified that 
if the brakes had been in good repair he could have 
stopped by reversing in about eight feet. The trial court 
submitted the case to the jury on the basis of the doc-
trine of last clear chance. 'l'his ruling was affirmed on 
appeal in the following language: 
'' * * * If the defendant knowingly placed in 
operation upon the public street a defective car, 
that could not be controlled because the appli-
ances provided for that purpose were out of re-
pair, and the injury complained of was occa-
sioned by such defective brakes and appliances, 
and the motorman was unable to avoid the ef-
fect of the contributory negligence of the de-
. ceased, because of such defects, then it would 
properly be said that the defendant's negligence 
was the proximate cause of the injury." 
In the case of Teakle v. San Pedro, L. A. & S .. L. R. 
Co., (decided May 9, 1907), 32 Utah 276, 90 P. 402, 408, 
409, decedent, a licensee on defendant's railroad track, 
stepped in front of a backing train, consisting of an 
engine, tender, mail car, and baggage car. He was 
struck by the baggage car and thrown between the rails. 
No part of the train injured him until he was struck 
by the firebox of the engine, which rolled, dragged and 
crushed him to death. The brakeman on the end of the 
baggage car gave signals to the engineer to stop as soon 
as decedent was struck, but was unable to attract the 
engineer's attention. Another witness ran along th~ 
track on the fireman's side of the train and attempted 
to attract his attention, but was unable to do so. There 
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was evidence that decedent was alive until struck by 
the firebox, and that had the brakes been applied im-
mediately after decedent was first struck, the train 
could have been stopped before the firebox reached him. 
The trial court directed a verdict in favor of defendant, 
and the Supreme Court of Utah reversed on the ground 
that the case should have been submitted to the jury 
under the doctrine of last clear chance. rrhe Court 
stated: 
" * * * rrhis court, in harmony with the great 
weight of authority, seems to be committed to 
the rule (when the injured or deceased person 
was not a trespasser) that the defendant's act 
of negligence will be regarded as the sole prox-
imate cause of the injury, not only when relating 
to a breach of duty occurring after the conse-
quences of contributory negligence have been dis-
covered, but also when, in the exercise of ordin-
ary care, such consequences could have been dis-
discovered, if a breach of du,ty intervened or con-
tinued after the commission of the contributory 
negligence. While the breach of duty must be 
subsequent to the commission of the contribu-
tory negligence, yet such breach of duty may 
be before, as well as after, the discovery of the 
peril. This principle of law has often been illus-
trated by cases where the owner of stock was 
guilty of negligence in permitting it to stray 
upon the railroad track, and where the liability 
of the company was made to depend, not only 
upon the question of whether the train operatives 
could have avoided the injury after the animal 
was discovered on or near the track, but also 
whether, in the exercise of ordinary care, the train 
operatives could or ought to have discovered it in 
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time to have avoided the injury. So also in cases 
where one was guilty of negligence in the first 
instance in going upon the track and by reason 
of being caught in a frog, or was otherwise rend-
ered unable to escape, and where the railroad 
company was held liable, not only for an omis-
sion of duty on the part of the train operatives 
after discovering the peril, but also for an omis-
sion of duty in not discovering it. In such cases 
the contributory negligence is deemed the re-
mote, and the defendant's negligence the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. Such is the principle 
of law which seems to have been announced by 
this court in the case of Hall v. Railway Co., 13 
Utah, 243, 44 Pac. 1046, 57 Am. St. Rep. 726, and 
in the case of Shaw v. City R. R. Co., 21 Utah 
77, 59 Pac. 552, and is the principle of law stated 
in the instruction which this court approved, 
and which was involved in the question decided 
by the court, in the case of Thompson v. Salt 
Lake Rapid Transit Co., 16 Utah 281, 52 Pac. 
92, 40 L.R.A. 172, 67 Am. St. Rep. 621, and is 
well illustrated in Inland & Seaboard Coasting 
Co. v. Tolson, 139 U. S. 557, 11 Sup. Ct. 653, 
35 L. Ed. 270, and in Grand Truck Ry. Co. v. 
Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 12 Sup. Ct. 679, 36 L. Ed. 
485." 
In Bunker v. Union Pac. R. Co., (decided Mar. 15, 
1911), 38 Utah 575, 114 P. 764, 775, plaintiff, an em-
ployee of defendant railroad company, brought action 
to recover for injuries alleged to have resulted from the 
neglect of the railroad company in failing to have and 
maintain efficient brakes on the engine of the train. The 
jury found the issues in favor of the defendant and the 
plaintiff appealed, citing as error, among other things, 
the failure to instruct adequately on the doctrine of 
last clear chance. The appellate court affirmed, holding 
that the jury had been sufficiently instructed on the 
doctrine, but also holding that the doctrine was applic-
able. Mr. Justice Straup, in his special concurrence, 
stated: 
'' * * * On the other hand, it is and was con-
tended by appellant that the braking appliances 
were defective, and that there is sufficient evi-
dence to justify a finding to that effect; and 
though the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in 
going upon or falling from the pilot, still there 
is sufficient evidence to show that immediately 
after he fell the head brakeman gave to the en-
gineer a stop signal which was seen by the en-
gineer, who immediately attempted to stop the 
train, but was, on account of the defective appli-
ances, unable to do so until the train had traveled 
a distance of SO to 100 feet; and that the serious 
injury to the appellant - the mangling of his 
arm, requiring its amputation - was caused at 
the place where his arm was wedged in between 
the rails by the wheels of the engine or cars 
there running over it, or by being wedged be-
tween the rails. I think there is sufficient evi-
dence to support such a theory of the appellant, 
and, had such facts been found in his favor, I 
think he would have been entitled to recover. 
Thompson v. Rapid Transit Co., 16 Utah 281, 
52 Pac. 92, 40 L.R.A. 172, 67 Am. St. Rep. 621; 
Teakle v. S., P. L. A. & S. L. R. Co., 32 Utah 
276, 90 Pac. 402, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 486." 
See also Pilmer v. Boise Traction Co., (decided 
Feb. 19, 1908), 14 Idaho 327, 94 P. 432, 438, where the 
Court stated: 
'' • * * The negligence of the deceased, if the 
jury should find that there was such negligence, 
becomes remote if it should be found that the 
motorman could have prevented the accident by 
having his car under proper control at said street 
crossing, or by lowering the fender on the car 
he could have prevented the serious consequences 
of the accident. The street car company owes a 
duty to the pedestrian, and must run its cars 
with due care in order to avoid doing him injury. 
While we regard rapid transit as indispensable 
in this rushing age, we do not esteem it of greater 
value than life and limb, and it must be con-
ducted with due care for the rights of others. 
Justice and humanity will not countenance the 
doctrine that a street railway company may, 
without liability, run down and maim or kill a 
human being who may have carelessly placed 
himself, unconsciously or otherwise, in a position 
to be injured or killed, simply because he was 
careless or negligent in placing himself in such 
position.'' 
It is true that the trial court endeavored to submit 
the issue of last clear chance to the jury in Instruction 
No. 12. However, as will be hereinafter pointed out the 
effect of Instruction No. 12 was completely minimized 
and rendered to no avail because of instructions on 
contributory negligence given by the trial court. 
(c) The trial court committed reversible error when 
) it instructed the jury that contributory negli_qence on 
the part of the plaintiff would be a complete bar to his ( 
recovery. (Assignment of Errors No. 1, 2, 3 and 4). 
This case was tried and submitted on the doctrine 
of the last clear chance. It is a well-established prin-
ciple of law that contributory negligence is immaterial 
where the last clear chance doctrine is applicable. Vol. 
38 Am. Jur. p . .900, ,par. 215 of Title Negligence, states 
the principle as follows: 
''The doctrine of last clear chance, otherwise 
known as the doctrine of discovered peril, as the 
doctrine of supervening negligence, and, less fre-
quently, as the humanitarian doctrine, stated 
broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff 
does not preclued a recovery for the negligence 
of the defendant where it appears that the de-
fendant by exercising reasonable care and pru-
dence might have avoided injurious consequences 
to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's 
negligence. The practical import of the doctrine 
is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a 
negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who 
has been grossly negligent in :placing himself in 
peril, if the defendant, aware of the plaintiff's 
peril, or, according to some but not all authori-
ties, although unaware of the plaintiff's peril, 
reasonably in the exercise of due care should 
have been aware of it, had in fact a later oppor-
tunity than the plaintiff to avoid an accident. 
As the doctrine usually is stated, a person who 
has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoid-
ing an accident, notwithstanding the negligent 
acts of his opponent or the negligence of a third 
person which is imputed to his opponent, is con-
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sidered in law solely responsible for the conse-
quences of the accident.'' 
In other words, a negligent defendant 1s held liable 
to a negligent plaintiff where the defendant has the 
last clear chance of avoiding accidental injury to the 
plaintiff. 
In the leading Utah case of Graham v. Johnson et 
al., ________ Utah ________ , 166 P. (2d) 230, 235, the following 
fact situation was presented: Plaintiff, age 13, was 
playing football in the street with two playmates, age 
14 and 12. Defendant drove her automobile along the 
street where plaintiff and his playmates were playing 
and observed them at play. Shortly after driving along 
the street she returned and drove past them again. On 
the second occasion of her driving past them she saw 
the plaintiff standing near the center of the street with 
his back to her car. Just before she reached the posi-
tion where plaintiff was standing, one of his playmates 
shouted, "Gary, look out." Upon hearing the shout 
plaintiff started to run at an angle in front of the car 
driven by defendant and was injured. 'l'he trial court 
at the conclusion of the case directed a verdict for the 
defendant on the theory that plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law, and that the 
doctrine of last clear chance was not applicable. The 
Supreme Court on appeal reversed and remanded for 
a new trial. 
"What we have really been considering is a 
rather unique application of the so-called last 
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clear chance doctrine. Our discussion has dealt 
with a negligent omission of Darlene in not timely 
sounding her horn - an omission actuated by a 
worthy motive but which the jury could never-
theless find to be negligence. It has also been 
conceded that the boys were negligent in that 
they were in violation of the ordinance against 
playing in the street which ordinance was de-
signed for their protection as well as for the 
expedition of traffic. Why then in this case does 
not the negligence of plaintiff bar recovery even 
though Darlene was negligent~ The reason lies 
in the fact that in this situation the so-called 
humanitarian doctrine of last clear chance ap-
plies. 
"In Chapter 17, Sees. 479 and 480 of Vol. 
II, Restatement of Torts, the last clear chance 
doctrine is stated in regard to two situations. 
Sec. 479 dealt with a situation where a plaintiff 
has been negligent in getting himself in a situ-
ation from which he cannot extricate himself 
or in getting himself in a condition where he can-
not by alertness avoid the danger in which defend-
ant subsequently puts him, example being when 
a man goes to sleep on a railroad track or gets 
his foot caught in a frog. In either case the point 
has been passed where 'lie .. could bY" a:Iertn.ess 
··avoid ·the danger of the oncoming tr~in. ··Sec. 
480 deals with the situation where the plaintiff 
was inattentive but had the ability, had he been 
alert, to avoid the oncoming danger to which 
the defendant was subjecting him. But in both 
cases the liability of the defendant arose because 
he failed to take the opportunity whis;_~ __ he ___ q],_Q!l~ 
-~ timely to avoid doing the plaintiff harm 
even though the plaintiff was negligent in get-
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ting himself i1~ a position where he was helpless 
or because he was so inattentive that he was not 
alert to the approaching danger over which de-
fendant had control.. And in both cases to hold 
the defendant liable it must plainly (l!,pvpear to 
the jury that defendant knew or reasonably 
should have known of plaintiff's helpless peril 
or of his inattention and after such rcali.zation 
or after he reasonably, had he been conducting 
himself with the vigilance required of him, should 
have known it, 'is negligent in failing to utilize 
with reasonable care and competence his then 
existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff.' 
In the clear chance doctrine the plaintiff's neg-
ligence has become in a sense fixea[£nd realiz(Jbl,,e 
~:a;:n;(ron ·to this state of things '"'defendant ap-
proaches on to the negligent plaintiff with and 
in control of the danger." 
The Supreme Court granted rehearing at the in-
stance of defendant to clarify itt; opinion and in a 
supplementary opinion at 172 P. (2) GG8, dii'enH;.;ing 
the doctrine of last clear chance and its relatiom;hip 
to plaintiff's negligence stated: 
" * * * The situation must be such that plain-
tiff is in a position of peril from defendant's 
operation either beca1tse plaintiff is inattentive 
or unaware of danger and thus negligent, or be-
cause he cannot extricate himself f1"0m a position 
of peru'fido which his negligence projected him. 
''To revert to the instant case: Darlene was 
cognizant of Gary's inattention and his unaware-
ness that she was approaching. He was negli-
gent in being where he was. She had ample op-
portunity to warn him and put him on attention. 
To do this timely the jury could find was a duty 
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which she owed to the plaintiff even in spite of 
his negligence and du.e to his situation. The jury 
could find that she omitted to perform her duty. 
What must she anticipate as a natural conse-
quence of her omission~ She must anticipate 
that if she is seemingly placing Gary in increas-
ing peril someone may be reasonably inspired 
automatically to warn him and that in response 
to the stimulus of that warning, he would or 
might naturally seek safety by running. What 
might be called the automatic chain stems from 
her omission timely to sound a warning. Nothing 
in this automatic chain is an independent super-
seding cause. The situation we are exposing is 
one where the chain of consequences due to fail-
ure to do that which the clear chance dictates, is 
automatic or semi-automatic - a causation chain 
as in the well known 'Squibb' case, stemming 
from the act of negligence of the defendant which 
was an omission to do what a prudent person 
would have done to avoid the accident when 
there was a clear opportunity to do so. That 
omission may have been defendant's only act 
of negligence but it is on one level and the plain-
tiff's on another level. The plaintiff's negligence 
was continuing but static. The defendant, who 
was controlling and operating the agency of ap-
proaching danger, had the clear chance to avoid 
the effect of the other's negligence and did not 
not do so. That was her negligence and it came 
after the plaintiff's negligence had become known 
and fixed.'' 
It is to be noted that this court in the Graham case 
recognizes clearly that the doctrine of last clear chance 
is applicable either where plaintiff is in a position of 
:peril because he is inattentive, or unaware of danger 
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and thus negligent, or where he cannot extricate him-
self from a position of peril into which his negligence 
has projected him. In the former situation plaintiff's 
negligence is continuing right to the point of the accident, 
but the defendant, who is controlling and operating the 
agency of approaching danger, has the clear chance to 
avoid the effect of the others negligence and does not 
do so. 
In the case of Locke v. Puget Sound International 
Ry. cf; Power Co., 100 Wash. 432, 171 P. 242, L.R.A. 
1919D 1119, it appeared that plaintiff was riding a 
tricycle in a diagonal direction along a highway across 
certain streetcar tracks and that the streetcar was ap-
proaching from his rear. Plaintiff's negligence was con-
tinuing up to the point of the accident. The court, in 
holding tha:t plaintiff's negligence under these circum-
stances was not a bar to his recovery, stated: 
"But the continued movement of a person 
toward a place of danger after a warning sound 
is notice that he is unaware of his peril, and is 
enough to break the reciprocal balance of duty, 
and, if it can be said that he had the time to do 
so, puts upon the motorman the positive duty 
of avoiding an accident." 
In the case of Harrington et al. v. Los Angeles Ry. 
Co .. , 140 Cal. 514, 74 P. 15, it appeared that deceased 
was killed in a collision with a streetcar while he was 
riding in a bicycle race as part of a Fourth of July 
celebration. At the time of his injury he was violating 
a city ordinance limiting the speed of bicycles and was 
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.found as a matter of law to be g·uilty of contributory 
negligence. As he and other participants in the bicycle 
race were approaching the intersection, the evidence 
indicated that the motorman observed the concourse of 
vehicles approaching. He also observed quite a number 
of individuals witnessing the bicycle race. 
"Ordinarily, the person operating the car has 
the right to assume that the one so approaching 
is able to and will care for himself, by taking 
all necessary precautions to observe the approach 
of the car, and that he will not place himself on 
the track at such a time as to be injured thereby. 
But no such assumption could be held to be 
justified under the peculiar circumstances al-
ready stated." 
In the Harrington case it is clear and indisputable 
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence 
which continued right to the point of the accident. How-
ever, because of his inattention and because the motor-
man was in possession and control of the instrumentality 
of danger and had the last clear opportunity of avoid-
ing the accident plaintiff's negligence was not a bar 
to his recovery. 
In this case the trial court in Instruction No. 4 
defined contributory negligence as follows: 
"b. 'Contributory negligence' means that a 
person injured has proximately contributed to 
such injury by his want of ordinary care, so that 
except for such want of ordinary care on his part 
the injury would not have resulted;'' 
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In Instruction No. 9 the trial court instructed the 
jury in part as follows : 
''If you should find that the brakes were de-
fective, still, in order to reach a verdict for 
plaintiff, you must, in addition, find from a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. 
By this is meant not just a possibility; it must 
have been a clear opportunity.'' 
By this language the jury is clearly instructed that only 
where the defendant had the last clear chance to have 
avoided injury to the plaintiff would plaintiff be able 
to recover. 
The Court, m Instruction No. 11, instructed the 
jury in part as follows: 
''If you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff failed to conform to 
any of the aforementioned duties which the law 
imposes upon him, that would constitute negli-
gence on his part, and, if he was thus negligent, 
and you further find from a preponderance of 
the evidence that such negligence proximately 
caused, or contributed to cause his own injury, 
then he can not recover.'' 
In Instruction No. 11 no mention is made of the last 
clear chance theory of liability whatsoever. Th~"jury 
is not instructed that even should they find plaintiff 
negligent he would be entitled to recover if the defend-
ant had the last clear chance to have avoided the acci-
dent had it not been for the condition of the train's 
/ 
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brakes. The jury is told in explicit, uncomprom1smg 
language that contributory negligence on the part of 
plaintiff would defeat his recovery. There is no room 
in such language for an exception if the last clear chance 
doctrine applies. Of course, in Instruction No. 12 the 
court instructs the jury in part upon the doetrine of 
last clear chance. 
''Even though an injured party, through his 
own negligence, placed himself in a position of 
peril, he may, nevertheless, recover if the one 
who injured him discovers, or by the exercise of 
ordinary care, should have discovered him and 
have avoided the injury. 
''Although you may find from the evidence 
that plaintiff was negligent as he approached 
said crossing, if you find from a preponderance 
of the evidence that the air-brakes were defective, 
and that the defendant, by using ordinary care 
under the circumstances, could have discovered 
plaintiff's peril and avoided the collision if the 
air-brakes had not been defective, then, under 
those circumstances, negligence on the part of 
the plaintiff would not bar his right to recover in 
this case. '' 
But who is to say which instruction was followed by 
the jury~ Instruction No. 11 where it is said that neg-
ligence on the part of plaintiff is a complete bar to his 
recovery, or Instruction No. 12 where plaintiff's negli-
gence is said not to be a complete bar where the last 
clear chance situation exists? Again in Instruction No. 
15 the court in uncompromising, positive and unequivo-
cal language sets forth the proposition that negligence 
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on the part of the plaintiff would bar his recovery. 
Again no reference whatsoever is made to a situation 
where his contributory negligence would not bar re-
covery, i.e., the last clear chance situation. 
''If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant was negligent, and that 
the plaintiff was also negligent, and that the negli-
gence of the plaintiff proximately caused or con-
tributed to cause his own injury and damage, then 
the plaintiff cannot recover. In other words, if 
both parties were guilty of negligent conduct, and 
the negligence of the plaintiff himself caused or 
contributed to cause his own injury, then he can 
not recover, even though the defendant may have 
been guilty of negligence which also proximately 
contributed to the injury to such plaintjff. 
"The law does not permit the jury to weigh 
the degree of negligence of the parties, where the 
negligence of both plaintiff and defendant concur 
to cause the injury." 
Again we ask which instruction did the jury follow, 
Instruction 12 or Instruction No. 15 °? w-e submit that 
Instruction No. 11 and Instruction No. 15 complete! y 
and effectively abrogate and render to no avail the 
entire doctrine of the last clear chance. 
The fundamental error into which the trial court 
has fallen is its assumption that if plaintiff's negligence 
continued and coincided in point of time with that of 
defendant, plaintiff could not recover. That is clearly 
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not the law under the fact situation presented by this 
case. In Instruction No. 15 the court has said: 
"The law does not permit the jury to weigh 
the degree of negligence of the parties, where the 
negligence of both plaintiff and defendant concur 
to cause the injury." 
As the court said in the Graham case : 
"That omission may have been defendant's only 
act of negligence but it is on one level and the 
plaintiff's on another level. T.he plaintiff's neg-
gligence was continuing but static. The defend-
ant, who was controlling and operating the agency 
of approaching danger, had the clear chance to 
avoid the effect of the other's negligence and did 
not do so."' 
The doctrine of last clear chance is sometimes 
spoken of as the humanitarian doctrine. That name was 
applied because of the very fact that plaintiff's contribu-
tory negligence, even though it may have continued down 
to and coincided in point of time with defendant's negli-
gence, nevertheless would not preclude him from recover-
ing where the defendant had the last clear opportunity of 
avoiding the accident and did not do so. 
In Instruction No. 11 the violation of duty which 
the court states would bar plaintiff's recovery was his 
failure to use his senses of sight and hearing and to keep 
a lookout ahead and to keep his car under safe control 
and to drive at a speed which was reasonable and prudent. 
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Any one or more of the acts of negligence set forth 
m the instruction acts as a complete bar to recovery. 
Instruction No. 15 generally states that contributory 
negligence will bar recovery. As has been pointed out, 
contributory negligence under the fact situation of this 
case would not and could not act as a bar to recovery 
if the jury believed that the plaintiff was in a position 
of peril because of inattention even though his inatten-
tion and consequent negligence continued right on t,) 
the point of collision. 
In Bisogno v. New York Rys. Co. 194 App. Div. 
316, 185 N. Y. Supp. 411, 412, there was evidenee that 
a boy nine years old, playing on the street, was walking 
on the railroad track in plain sight of the motorman 
while the car was traveling at least 100 feet, and that 
the motorman did not slacken his speed or ring his bell, 
and that after the car hit the boy it proceeded 100 feet 
before it was stopped. vVith this evidence in mind at 
the close of the case the Court charged the jury in the 
following language: 
"The Court: 'I shall not charge it in that 
way. I will charge it in this way: That if the 
situation at the time of or just before the acci-
dent, as between the car and the boy, was such 
that the accident could have been avoided if the 
motorman had used reasonable care and diligence, 
then that would justify the jury in finding the 
defendant had been negligent. I will say further: 
One may put himself in a dangerous position, 
an imprudent position, with respect to another; 
but, if the danger can be avoided by reasonable 
diligence on the part of that other, it stands to 
reason that he has no right to bring on the ac-
cident by failing to exercise that diligence.' '' 
Thereafter, however, upon request of counsel for the 
defendant the Court made the following charge: 
" 'Now, that there may be no mistake on the 
part of the jurors as to what your honor means, 
in response to the request made by plaintiff's 
counsel, I understand your honor to charge that 
the negligence of the motorman can be established 
by the fact that the boy was in a place so danger-
ous, so far ahead of him, that with the exercise 
of reasonable care he could have stopped; but 
will your honor also charge the jury that that 
does not entitle the plaintiff to a verdict - that 
if both were negligent, both the boy and the 
~iriotorman, there cannot be any recovery? 
'' 'The Court : I so charge. 
" '(Plaintiff's Counsel) : I except to that.' " 
The Supreme Court of New York had squarely be-
fore it the same problem that is before this Court. 
There was an instruction on the doctrine of last clear 
chance and another instruction to the effect that con-
tributory negligence would bar recovery on the part of 
the plaintiff. The trial court recognized the prejudice 
existing where two contrary and antagonistic instruc-
tions are given to the jury, one containing the doctrine 
of last clear chance, and the other contributory negli-
gence as a bar to recovery, and stated : 
''That was the last word to the jury, and 
completely annulled and wiped out and destroyed 
/ 
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the previously quoted charge, made at the request 
of the plaintiff's counsel. _In other words, the 
case was finally submitted to the jury on the 
plain doctrine that contributory negligence would 
prevent a recovery. In my opinion that was 
. error, and of such a character as requires re-
versal of this judgment. The doctrine of a last 
clear chance has been fre'quently applied in this 
state." 
* • • * * 
" • * * But, if he did negligently go upon the 
track so far ahead of this car as might have been 
found by the evidence that he did, the doctrine 
of the last clear chance to my mind is applicable, 
and that if, seeing him in that position, the motor-
man had used ordinary care, the accident would 
not have occurred. That issue being presented 
by the evidence, the court having correctly 
charged the doctrine, and then upon the induce-
ment of the defendant's attorney having de-
stroyed it, an error of law is presented which 
we cannot overlook." 
The New York Court of Appeals supported the Su-
preme Court of the State of New York and affirmed 
the Bisogno decision in 135 N. E. 947, 233 N. Y. 629. 
This opinion responds to logic and reason, for negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff will not under any 
circumstances preclude him from recovering damagPs 
if the defendant might, by the exercise of care on his 
part, have avoided the consequences of the negligence 
or carelessness on the part of the plaintiff. There may 
be mutual negligence, and yet one party have a right 
of action against the other if the other party had the 
last clear chance to have avoided the accident. See 
Mallard v. Ninth Avenue Railroad Co., 15 Daly, 376, 
7 N.Y. Supp. 666, cited in the Bisogno case, and that, of 
course, is the very error into which the trial court fell 
in this case when it stated in Instruction No. 15 that 
if both parties were guilty of negligent conduct which 
contributed to cause plaintiff's injury then he could not 
recover. 
In the case of Michigan City v. Werner, (Ind. dec. 
1916) 114 N. E. 636, 186 Ind. 149, the plaintiff was 
crossing a bridge when it was raised by the bridge ten-
der. Defendant requested an instruction that the jury 
should find for the defendant if plaintiff was negli-
gent in entering upon the bridge in an attempt to cross it. 
This instruction was refused by the trial court for the 
reason that contributory negligence is not a defense 
where the last clear chance situation exists and that it 
is improper and erroneous for a court to instruct the 
jury that contributory negligence will bar recovery un-
less the jury is at the same time and as an explicit 
qualification of that instruction instructed that if the 
defendant had the last clear chance to have avoided 
the accident and injuries then plaintiff's negligence 
would not bar recovery and plaintiff would be entitled 
to a verdict. The Court stated: 
''Instruction No. 4, refused by the court, if 
given, would have been in conflict with in-
struction No. 7, which properly states the law. 
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The instruction refused directed the jury, in 
effect, to find for the defendant if it appeared 
that the plaintiff was negligent in entering upon 
the bridge in an attempt to cross it. Under the 
doctrine of last clear chance, as stated in in-
struction No. 7, to the effect that if the injury to 
the plaintiff was immediately caused by the neg-
ligence of the bridge tender after he became 
aware of the dangerous situation of plaintiff 
and to his failure to use ordinary care to avoid 
injury to him, then the plaintiff was entitled to 
recover notwithstanding his prior negligence in 
entering upon the bridge." 
In 64 C. J. Sec. 600, it is stated: 
"It is proper to refuse, and error to give 
conflicting and contradictory instructions, since 
a charge containing two distinct propositions 
conflicting with each other tends so to confuse 
the jury as to prevent their rendition of an intel-
ligent verdict, the jury cannot be required to de-
termine what part of a contradictory charge is 
correct, or left to reconcile conflicting principles 
of law; it ordinarily cannot be determined from 
the verdict which rule was adopted by the jury, 
the court is left in doubt and uncertainty as to 
the facts actually found by the jury as a basis 
for its verdict, and where instructions are incon-
sistent with, or contradict, each other, it is usu-
ally impossible to say whether the jury were 
controlled by the one or the other.'' 
We submit that the court's instructions on last 
clear chance and on contributory negligence were con-










Courts have held under many circumstances that 
giVmg of conflicting instructions constitutes reversible 
error. 
In Atlantic Co. et al. v. Roberts, 179 Va. 669, 20 
S. E. (2d) 520, it appeared that the fact situation war-
ranted an instruction on unavoidable accident. One of 
the instructions was to the effect that if plaintiff was 
free from fault the jury could find the issues in favor 
of plaintiff and against the defendant. The court held 
that the giving of the instruction under the facts of this 
particular case without qualifying it by setting forth 
the unavoidable accident situation was reversible er-
ror. The Court stated: 
"Instruction No. 3 is erroneous in that it 
makes no reference to an unavoidable accident, 
but would allow recovery if the jury simply found 
the plaintiff free of fault. This instruction is 
thus in conflict with and vitiates instruction "G", 
given on behalf of the defendants, which is m 
the following language: 
'' 'The court instructs the jury that if you 
believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was 
injured as a result of an unavoidable accident, 
then your verdict must be for the defendant.' " 
We believe the situation presented by the Roberts 
case is clearly analagous to the case at bar. Here the fact 
situation presented a jury question on last clear chance. 
To instruct th~_t..__c()_I1txibut9ry _gggJigen~e was a bar to 
------·--·~--------- ... . . ·- . . ··- -~----"···-·------ .... ,..,.--.. .... ~-·-·" ,, 
recovery withouL . qllalifyiug ... .said instruction by pre-
--~ ·--~ .,. ..... ~ ......... _,.,.....,.~ ...... ,.,_ 
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senting the last clear chance situation as an exception 
'\V:as-Cleariy ~rron~~~~---- - --- -- -
'-~_..-----~-----
In Kuether v. Kansas City Light J'; Power Co., (Mo.) 
276 S. W. 105, 109, the court held that instructing the 
jury in a situation where the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur was properly applicable that they had no right to 
presume negligence if the evidence did not preponderate 
in favor of the plaintiff, would have been reversible error. 
The Court stated: 
"Defendant directs another charge of error 
against the action of the court in refusing de-
fendant's proferred instruction D5, where it was 
sought to tell the jury that they have 'no right 
to presume negligence, and, if the evidence does 
not preponderate in favor of plaintiff, then your 
verdict should be for the defendant.' 'l'his is con-
tradictory of, and in conflict with, plaintiff's in-
structions 1 and 2, which we hold properly in-
cluded the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The 
instruction of defendant was properly refused.'' 
See also Oettinger v .. Stewart, (Cal. 1943), 137 P. (:2) 8G2. 
In Thomas v. Stott (Mo.) 114 S. W. (2d) 142, 144, 
a situation is presented which is the reverse of the case 
at bar. The court found that there was a fact situation 
presented in which the jury could find that plaintiff's 
negligence was the sole negligence in the case and held 
that instructing the jury that contributory negligence 
does not defeat recovery under the humanitarian doc-
trine without also instructing that the sole negligence 
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of the plaintiff would defeat recovery was error. The 
Court stated: 
''While contributory negligence does not de-
feat recovery under the humanitarian doctrine, 
still the doctrine is now well established that sole 
negligence of plaintiff may defeat recovery. It 
follows that if there be substantial evidence that 
a plaintiff's injury be caused by plaintiff's sole 
negligence, then defendant is entitled to an in-
struction submitting the question of sole negli-
gence of plaintiff. Borgstede v. Waldbauer, 337 
Mo. 1205, 88 S. W. 2d 373. We conclude that the 
evidence given by the defendant in this case jus-
tifies the giving of instruction F. 
''As to instruction No. 1, the same conforms 
in substance to instructions that have been ap-
proved. However, as the question of sole negli-
gence is involved in this case, we conclude that 
the instruction presents reversible error in that 
it permits the jury to find for plaintiff regard-
less of the fact of whether or not her negligence 
was the sole cause of her injury. Instruction No. 
1, we conclude, is in error, also, for the reason 
that it is in conflict with a proper instruction 
given on behalf of defendant." 
Other cases where it has been held that instructions 
were conflicting and therefore prejudicial are herein 
cited for the convenience of the court: Westberg v. 
Willde (Cal.) 85 P. (2d) 507; Morrison v. Perry (Utah, 
1943) 140 P. (2d) 772; Alcamisi v. Market St. Ry. Co., 
67 Cal. App. 710, 228 P. 410; Hageman v. Arnold (Mont.) 
254 P. 1070; Skelton v. Great Northern Ry Co., (Mont.) 
100 P. (2d) 929. 
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We recogmze the doctrine that the instructions as 
given by the court are to be considered and read as a 
whole. However, where two instructions are apparently 
conflicting and are not related one to the other by ref-
erence, as in the case at bar, what was said in the case 
of John O'Brien Boiler Works Co. v. Sievert et al, 266 
S. W. 555, 557 is clearly applicable. 
" * * * The plaintiff's instruction declares one 
rule of law and exacts a verdict upon it; the de-
fendant's instruction declares a different rule 
of law squarely in conflict with that declared in 
plaintiff's instruction, and exacts a verdict upon 
it. The conflict arises upon the essentials of 
plaintiff's cause of action. The instruction given 
for plaintiff erroneously declares the law of 
plaintiff's case, and is so drawn as to exclude 
elements essential to the recovery the instruc-
tion exacts. Such an instruction is not, and can-
not be, cured of its infirmity by an instruction 
given for defendant correctly declaring the law." 
CONCLUSION 
We submit in conclusion that Lloyd C. Andersen 
was entitled to have the issue of last clear chance clearly 
and correctly submitted to the jury. 
His negligence, if any, was that of inattention and 
oblivion to approaching danger. This negligence coin-
cided in point of time with that of the defendant in main-
taining unsafe and inadequate braking equipment on 
its train, but was on a different level. See Graharn case. 
~ ... ,. .... , _..,..,_..~, •. ,..~···..,,~ ..... ·~~·~~-·-,.;........-... ..,. _ __....!,.. 
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'rhe Court's Instructions ~ o. 11 and No. 15 placed 
squarely before the jury the proposition that plaintiff's 
contributory negligence would preclude his recovery. In 
neither instruction was mention made of the doctrine 
of last clear chance. Even though the jury believed that 
had the train's brakes operated properly the accident 
could clearly have been avoided, under Instructions No. 
11 and No. 15 they were directed to return a verdict 
against plaintiff if he was himself negligent. 
The instructions on last clear chance and contrib-
utory negligence were clearly contradictory and con-
flicting and the entire doctrine of last clear chance was 
thereby annulled, wiped out and destroyed. 
We, therefore, respectfully submit that this case, 
should be remanded to the trial court for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK 
& ROBERTS 
WAYNE L. BLACK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
